The latest reporting indicates that the Ministry of Defence is now considering two additional Scorpène-derived submarines, rather than the three previously under consideration, as Project-75(I) moves toward final approval. The immediate pressure point is cost: the proposed follow-on boats would incorporate newer technologies and modifications rather than simply repeating the original P-75 configuration.
India’s decision to scale down the proposed follow-on Kalvari-class submarine order from three boats to two reflects a larger procurement calculation than a simple budget cut. The Indian Navy is simultaneously trying to preserve submarine-building continuity at Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), modernise the Kalvari design with indigenous technologies and move ahead with the much larger Project-75(I) program.
This creates a classic defence-procurement trade-off. India needs additional conventional submarines quickly, but every additional Scorpène consumes capital that could otherwise support the six larger P-75(I) boats and the longer-term transition toward an indigenous submarine design under Project-76.
The Price Shock: How Custom Indigenous Specifications Could Push ‘Super Kalvari’ Costs Up
The key to understanding the Super Kalvari cost comparison with the baseline P-75 is that these would not necessarily be simple repeat-production submarines.
The original six Kalvari-class boats were built at MDL from the French Scorpène design, with INS Vagsheer—the sixth submarine—commissioned in January 2025. The proposed follow-on configuration is intended to absorb newer Indian requirements, particularly indigenous propulsion and combat-system technologies.
DRDO's fuel-cell AIP is already moving toward integration with the Kalvari family. In December 2024, the MoD signed a ₹1,990-crore contract with MDL for construction of the AIP plug and its integration, while Naval Group received a separate contract for Electronic Heavy Weight Torpedo integration. Earlier, DRDO and Naval Group had signed an agreement to develop the detailed design for integrating India's indigenous AIP into the Scorpène platform.
That integration is fundamentally different from buying an unchanged repeat hull. Structural modifications, certification, systems integration and testing can generate significant non-recurring engineering costs.
Lithium-ion battery technology is another potential differentiator. Naval Group's own description of the Scorpène Evolved configuration for Indonesia identifies lithium-ion batteries and a new propulsion architecture, demonstrating that Evolved Scorpène configurations can incorporate substantial technological changes.
However, claims that India's proposed follow-on boats have definitively been contracted with LFP batteries and a completely indigenous CMS replacing SUBTICS should be treated cautiously. Those details have been reported in defence-media discussions but are not yet established by a public final contract.
That distinction matters because the higher price appears to be associated with the broader customisation and technology-refresh requirement, rather than simply an across-the-board price increase from Naval Group.
Baseline Kalvari vs. ‘Super Kalvari’ vs. Project-75(I)
| Parameter | Baseline Kalvari — P-75 | Follow-On ‘Super Kalvari’ — 2 Boats | Project-75(I) — 6 Boats |
|---|---|---|---|
| Units | 6 | 2 currently under consideration | 6 |
| Industrial model | Naval Group / MDL | Naval Group / MDL | TKMS / MDL |
| Basic architecture | Scorpène-derived diesel-electric | Scorpène-derived, technology-upgraded configuration | New-generation AIP conventional submarine |
| AIP | DRDO AIP integration planned/being implemented through refits | Indigenous AIP integration is a major objective | Factory-integrated AIP |
| Battery technology | Conventional baseline architecture | Advanced battery technology is expected to be considered | Advanced energy-storage architecture |
| Combat systems | SUBTICS-based architecture | Greater Indian-system integration expected | New-generation combat architecture |
| Strategic role | Immediate conventional submarine force | Fleet bridge + technology maturation | Long-term modern conventional fleet |
Note: “Super Kalvari” refers to the proposed follow-on Scorpène-derived configuration; specific equipment and configuration details remain subject to final procurement and design decisions.
Balancing the Ledger: Protecting the ₹70,000–80,000 Crore Project-75(I) Outlay
The second half of the equation is Project-75(I).
India's long-delayed P-75(I) programme calls for six advanced conventional submarines to be built at MDL with Germany's thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). The programme has been reported at roughly ₹70,000 crore, although some recent reporting has placed the broader potential value closer to ₹80,000 crore or more depending on the final package and associated costs.
This creates an important capital-allocation problem.
A third additional Kalvari would provide another relatively near-term hull based on a mature industrial design. But P-75(I) represents a much larger technological and financial commitment, including AIP, newer combat systems and long-endurance capabilities.
Consequently, reducing the follow-on Scorpène requirement from three to two can be viewed as a compromise: India retains an additional production bridge without allowing the near-term Scorpène programme to consume capital needed for the six-boat P-75(I) fleet.
The strategic logic is particularly important because P-75(I) deliveries will take years after contract signature. The Navy therefore has to balance near-term fleet numbers against long-term submarine capability rather than simply maximise the number of hulls ordered today.
The 2-Boat Bridge: Sustaining MDL and Managing the Shishumar Sunset
The two-boat decision also has an industrial dimension.
MDL has accumulated specialised expertise in submarine construction through the Scorpène programme. Naval Group says the P-75 programme has also helped establish an Indian industrial ecosystem capable of manufacturing numerous components and systems for submarines.
Allowing the production ecosystem to lose momentum before P-75(I) reaches full-scale construction could mean losing skilled labour, supplier capability, tooling knowledge and production efficiency.
Two additional Kalvari-derived boats can therefore function as a bridge order.
There is also a fleet-management imperative. India's older Shishumar-class Type 209/1500 submarines, introduced from the 1980s onward, are approaching the later stages of their service lives. Additional Kalvari boats cannot perfectly replace every capability of every retiring submarine, but they can help prevent the conventional-submarine fleet from shrinking too rapidly while P-75(I) is still moving through procurement and construction.
The result is a three-way balancing act:
fleet availability + MDL production continuity + P-75(I) affordability.
Two boats may offer enough additional workload to preserve industrial continuity while reducing the financial burden compared with a three-boat order.
The Project-76 Connection: Testbed for India’s Fully Indigenous Submarine
The longer-term significance of the follow-on Kalvari programme lies in Project-76.
Project-76 is intended to give India an indigenous conventional submarine design capability rather than continuing the pattern of foreign-origin designs. DRDO's preliminary work includes substantial indigenous content covering weapons, combat-management systems, sonar, communications, electronic warfare and other systems.
The programme is expected to centre on a roughly 3,000-tonne conventional submarine, with the design targeted for completion around 2028.
This is where the technology installed or validated on Kalvari-derived platforms could become strategically valuable.
India is already moving toward sea-going validation of its indigenous PAFC-based AIP. The technology could provide practical experience in fuel-cell integration, thermal management, power management, submarine safety and long-duration submerged operations before those technologies migrate into a clean-sheet indigenous design.
Similarly, lithium-ion battery technology and indigenous combat electronics could eventually provide valuable operational and integration lessons.
But there is an important distinction: the two additional Kalvari submarines should not automatically be described as formal Project-76 testbeds unless the Navy explicitly assigns that role. It is more accurate to describe them as potential technology-validation and risk-reduction platforms whose operational experience could benefit Project-76.
That distinction makes the strategic argument stronger, not weaker.
The Real Reason Behind the Two-Boat Compromise
The decision to reduce the proposed follow-on Kalvari purchase from three submarines to two should therefore be read as capital optimisation rather than abandonment of the Scorpène line.
India still needs additional conventional submarines, but the economics change when an established design is heavily modified with indigenous AIP, newer batteries, weapons and other systems. At that point, the follow-on boat is no longer simply a cheaper repeat of the original Kalvari.
At the same time, P-75(I) represents a substantially larger financial commitment and is intended to deliver a new generation of long-endurance conventional submarines. Finance therefore becomes a question of sequencing capabilities, not merely counting hulls.
The two-boat option offers New Delhi a middle path: keep MDL's submarine-production ecosystem active, add urgently needed conventional-submarine capacity, validate Indian technologies where possible and preserve fiscal headroom for P-75(I).
The deeper strategic payoff could ultimately extend beyond either programme. If India's DRDO AIP, advanced batteries and indigenous combat architecture mature through operational experience, they can feed into the country's much more consequential objective: designing and building its own next-generation conventional submarine under Project-76.
In that sense, the “Super Kalvari” is less important as a three-versus-two procurement statistic than as a bridge between India's French-assisted Scorpène experience and its ambition for a genuinely indigenous submarine-industrial ecosystem.
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